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1. Introduction
The struggle to enforce federal securities laws that prohibit insider trading
[1) has recently been described as an unwinnable war [2]. Violations are
difficult to detect, expensive to investigate, and extremely troublesome to
prove. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), nonetheless, remains
intransigent in the face of adversity. The Director of the SEC's Division of
Enforcement, John M. Fedders, has pledged to "intensify... efforts to prevent,
detect and prosecute" trading based on non-public information [3]. Comment-
ing on an article in Fortune magazine cilled "The Unwinnable War on Insider
Trading", SEC Commissioner Barbara Thomas announced that "everyone
contemplating this sort of activity should understand that we will keep fighting
the battle vigorously, and he or she trades at his or her peril" [4].
Although the SEC has succeeded in increasing the riskiness of insider
trading [5], the Commission's efforts are frequently thwarted when the violator
has traded through a foreign bank. Bank secrecy laws in Switzerland, as well as
in other countries, have proved an effective shield for traders desiring anonym-
ity. Fortune's assessment is gloomy - "Someone with a Swiss bank account
and access to inside information can usually run roughshod through the
financial markets, with little likelihood of being caught" [6]. An investigation
of trades executed through foreign banks may be the toughest battle in the
unwinnable war.
This paper will describe SEC enforcement problems [7] from both a legal
and a policy perspective, and it will examine possible solutions. Section 2 will
present the legal conflict through a discussion of the competing points of view
of the United States and Switzerland [8]. Section 3 will analyze the enforce-
ment methods available to the SEC and to the courts, with particular emphasis
on recent litigation resulting from an SEC investigation of insider trading in
the stock and options of St. Joe Minerals Corporation.
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2. The conflict
When an insider-trading transaction is executed on a U.S. exchange by a
Swiss bank, the legal conflict arises from a twofold discrepancy between U.S.
law and Swiss law. First, insider trading, a criminal offense in the United
States, is not outlawed in Switzerland [9]. Secondly, in the United States
bankers have a duty to disclose banking information to government authori-
ties, so long as the investigation is not deemed unnecessary; and in some states
they have no obligation of confidentiality beyond that imposed by considera-
tions of professional ethics [10]. In Switzerland bankers may not disclose
banking information to government authorities or anyone else except by
specific court order or the customer's express permission [11]. When the SEC
uncovers evidence of insider trading that leads to a Swiss bank, the SEC's
legally mandated inquiry into the identity of the bank's trading customers may
be met by a reply that disclosure would subject the bank and its officers "to
the risk of long-term imprisonment, fine, civil liability, and administrative
sanction in Switzerland" [12].
2.1. The United States perspective
There is no doubt that non-public information is widely used in trading on
U.S. exchanges. A 1980 study by Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc. showed a
"clear pattern of pre-announcement buying" in stocks of tender offer target
companies [13]. A similar study by Fortune magazine showed that in twenty
randomly selected tender offers and acquisitions in 1980 and 1981 a large gain
in stock price preceded the formal announcement [14]. Although some rise in
the stock price can be explained by neutral factors such as last-minute buying
by the acquiring company, the clear implication of these studies is that
someone had advance knowledge of the proposed takeovers and was acting on
that information. Because takeovers are complicated transactions requiring the
services of lawyers, accountants, financial analysts, and others, a rather large
number of individuals routinely hear of a transaction before it is publicly
announced.
Large potential profits create a substantial temptation to trade on non-pub-
lic information. The announcement of a tender offer usually raises the trading
price of the target company's stock by the amount of the premium that the
bidder has offered to pay. One who has pre-announcement knowledge and
buys at the lower pre-announcement price may realize a very high return on
investment [15] in a very short period of time. For one who chooses to buy
options, as opposed to stock, potential profits are even more spectacular. If
"'playing options" is an informed gamble for the experienced trader, for the
inside trader it is gambling on a sure thing. For example, with knowledge that
Company X is about to make an offer for the stock of Company Y at $80 per
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share (assume this is roughly twice the price at which Y stock presently trades)
one could buy a thousand call options, for 100 shares each, with a striking
price of 45 and very quickly turn as little as $6,250 into $3.5 million [16].
However lucrative these trades may be, they violate the federal securities
laws. Rule lOb-5 prohibits trading on the basis of material non-public informa-
tion [17]. Material non-public information, often called "inside information"
[18], is information that, if disclosed, would significantly affect market values.
Examples given by the New York Stock Exchange include "negotiations
leading to acquisitions and mergers, stock splits, the making of arrangements
preparatory to an exchange or tender offer, changes in dividend rates or
earnings, calls for redemption, new contracts, products or discoveries" [19].
There is some uncertainty in U.S. law concerning the extent to which the
illegality of trading on non-public information depends upon the trader's
relationship to the subject and source of his information. In Chiarella v. United
States [20], the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a financial printer
who traded on knowledge he obtained by deciphering the identities of code-
named companies in tender offer materials being printed. The Court's decision
was based on its finding that Chiarella had no fiduciary relationship with the
shareholders whose stock he bought and therefore no duty to disclose the
information he possessed [21]. If illegality depends on a trader's fiduciary
responsibility, it becomes essential for the SEC to know the trader's identity
early in an investigation. Read very broadly, the opinion could even raise
doubts about whether the large group of professional associates of a corpora-
tion who become temporarily privy to inside information - accountants,
bankers, etc. - may trade on that information without violating rule lOb-5.
Under this broad reading, when suspicious trading activity has been routed
through Switzerland, even the existence of a probable violation of U.S. law
would be undetectable without investigatory assistance from Swiss banks.
The SEC, however, has made it clear that it does not so read Chiarella.
First, since Chiarella was decided, the SEC has brought at least two lob-5
actions based on a theory of misappropriation of non-public information [221.
Chiarella might have been convicted on this theory, but the Supreme Court did
not decide the issue because it had not been properly presented to the jury in
the court below [23]. Secondly, in the light of the judicial limitations placed on
rule lOb-5, the SEC exercised its rule-making authority under section 14(e) of
the Williams Act and, by promulgating rule 14e-3, reversed Chiarella insofar as
it applied to non-public information concerning a tender offer [24]. Although
there is some debate among commentators as to the validity of rule 14e-3 in
the face of Chiarella [25], the rule stands; the SEC proceeds under that rule
and it has not been overruled. As a practical matter, insider trading is illegal in
almost all situations that the SEC investigates [26].
Beyond the Chiarella/Rule 14e-3 debate about where the regulatory line
ought to be drawn, some commentators dispute the wisdom of trying to
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regulate insider trading at all [27]. Insider-trading prohibitions are founded on
a theory of fairness and are intended to promote public confidence in the U.S.
securities markets [28]. It is believed that if profits based on inside information
were routinely available to a well-connected few, this would create a clear
disincentive to investment by the general public. Case law discussions of
insider-trading liability make sweeping reference to principles of "relatively
equal access to material information" [29], "limiting opportunities for profit
from manipulation of confidential connections" [30], and "the inherent unfair-
ness involved where a party takes advantage of... information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing" [31]. Those commentators who
are opposed to the insider-trading laws reject the "fairness" argument as overly
moralistic, preferring that insider-trading regulation be evaluated in terms of
economic costs and benefits. When enforcement is sought against Swiss bank
account holders, opponents argue that the cost of regulation is particularly
prohibitive.
Proponents of insider-trading regulation, however, find additional fairness
considerations to support action against those who trade illegally through
Swiss banks. Aside from the obvious lack of fairness in allowing Swiss bank
account holders to profit where others risk criminal sanctions, it seems
probable that traders with access to Swiss banks are those most likely to be
taking unfair advantage of their connections. They are more likely to be the
close friends of presidents of Fortune 500 companies, international marketing
vice presidents, takeover specialists, or investment bankers. They are least
likely to have heard something on the Street, at a cocktail party, while waiting
on the CEO's table at lunch, or to have figured it out while printing financial
documents. In addition, U.S. broker-dealers are put at a competitive disad-
vantage because Swiss banks performing the same trading services can also
offer their customers secrecy [32].
In the fifteen years since publication of the economic cost argument against
insider-trading regulation [33], neither the SEC nor Congress has accepted its
validity. Granting the premise that insider-trading laws should be enforced
domestically, selective non-enforcement in cases involving Swiss bank secrecy
laws would undoubtedly undermine all enforcement efforts [34]. Traders with
inside information who would otherwise place trading orders with their
customary broker or local Merrill Lynch branch [35] might be more inclined to
take the trouble to establish trading channels in a secrecy jurisdiction. Cautious
traders who would ordinarily keep the size of their transactions small to avoid
detection could feel much freer to seek large illegal profits.
Finally, secrecy-jurisdiction trading on inside information may be a prob-
lem of substantial size. In 1976, the U.S. Treasury reported to Congress that
the most notable characteristic of foreign portfolio investment was its rapid
growth. At that time, the U.S. Treasury calculated its value at $44 billion [36].
According to a Securities Industry Association estimate, foreign holdings of
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U.S. equity securities may have amounted to between $127 and $176 billion in
1980 [37]. Even more significant is the huge volume of trading on U.S. stock
exchanges attributable to foreign financial institutions. Some people estimate
that Swiss banks alone account for as much as 20% of the trading volume on
the New York Stock Exchange [38].
This internationalization of U.S. securities markets creates a dual imperative
affecting U.S. regulators. Enforcement of insider-trading prohibitions must
function effectively and must also take due account of international comity
and the interests of non-U.S. financial institutions [39].
2.2. The Swiss perspective
Unlike U.S. banks, Swiss banks perform both commercial and investment
banking functions. In addition to the traditional commercial banking services
they perform, Swiss banks buy and sell securities, either for their own account
or for their customers. Swiss banks also keep accounts with New York
brokerage houses through which they effect transactions on behalf of their
customers. The Swiss banks' involvement in the U.S. securities market is
substantial [40] and the identities of their customers in all these activities is
protected by Swiss banking secrecy law [41].
Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law is the principal provision creating
criminal liability for divulging secrets entrusted to a bank. Enacted in 1934 as a
public law measure to prevent Swiss bank collaboration with the Third Reich
in its efforts to locate the bank accounts of Jews and other non-Aryans, Article
47 actually reinforced well-established principles of bank secrecy already
existing in private law [42]. These principles included personal financial-privacy
rights based on the Swiss Civil Code, the contractual duty of confidentiality
owed by the banker to his client (based on the Code of Obligations), and the
Penal Code's protection of Swiss trade and industry against economic espionage
[43].
The Swiss place a high value on bank secrecy. Privacy in financial and
economic matters may not always be completely separated from privacy in
other, personal matters [44]. As in 1934, when secrecy was perceived as
necessary to prevent political oppression, today Swiss bank secrecy is valued
by many individuals in countries where political changes could create personal
vulnerability. It is not only because of financial privacy, however, that secrecy
is of great importance to the Swiss. Because secrecy protects bankers and
creates public confidence in banks, it has become a cornerstone of the Swiss
banking business, which is a key industry in Switzerland [45]. Nonetheless, it is
not the Swiss intention to sanction economic crime or to gain stature as a
major exporter of illegal schemes. Accordingly, Swiss law recognizes certain
interests that may override secrecy.
The limits placed on Swiss bank secrecy derive principally from Swiss
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federal and cantonal law, as well as private agreement among Swiss banks.
Additional limitations exist under international agreements for cooperation
and mutual assistance in criminal matters.
On the federal level in Switzerland, the criminal and civil procedure codes
stipulate a public duty of testimony. Because bank secrecy is principally of a
private law nature, in a federal criminal or civil case a banker's private duty of
secrecy is usually superseded by his public duty of testimony. A Swiss judge,
however, would have the discretion to release the banker from his public duty
[46]. In administrative proceedings, there is a statutory exemption for bankers
[47]. Thus, the preservation of bank secrecy in a Swiss federal criminal or civil
case would be subject to judicial discretion, but it is fairly clear that secrecy
would remain intact in an administrative proceeding.
Swiss cantonal law is more widely applicable than federal law and it also
stipulates a public duty of testimony. In criminal matters banking secrecy
cannot be invoked, but if a civil matter is involved, four of the Swiss cantons
give judges the power to lift bank secrecy. The remaining cantons are divided
into two groups: those cantons which do not permit a banker to testify in civil
cases and those which require him to do so. Thus, in a civil case governed by
cantonal law, the preservation of bank secrecy largely depends on the location
of the proceedings [48].
In a public matter, only a Swiss judge may lift the veil of bank secrecy. For
example, when a foreign state requests information pursuant to letters roga-
tory, a Swiss judge is empowered to order disclosure if authorized by a specific
provision of the law. At present, Swiss treaty provisions apply only to
information concerning activities that are classified as criminal offenses in
Switzerland [49]. If the matter is private [50], however, the client himself may,
by waiving his contractual rights, authorize disclosure of his business secret.
The banks themselves, cognizant of the importance of fighting economic
crime, have signed a private Agreement which has been in effect since July
1977 [51]. The Agreement, governed by private law and implemented by the
Swiss National Bank, provides for very high fines in the case of specified
abuses of bank secrecy [521. Of particular relevance are provisions requiring
the banks to ascertain the beneficial owners of each account [53] and prohibit-
ing them from supporting any attempt to deceive authorities in Switzerland or
elsewhere [54]. The former provision insures that a banker who is required to
testify cannot claim to be ignorant of the identity of the account holder on
whose behalf business is transacted. The latter provision is more limited. Even
though a Swiss banker knows of attempted deception, he cannot offer his
knowledge to the authorities. Similarly, although the Agreement forbids
accepting funds or carrying out business known to be illegal under Swiss law
(as insider trading is not), disclosure of the would-be violator's identity is not
permitted without judicial bidding.
The strongest private measure taken against insider trading is a Circular
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Letter issued by the Swiss Bankers Association in 1968, advising its members
that it is in their interest to avoid engaging in transactions that would violate
U.S. insider-trading laws [55]. This advice is, of course, not legally binding.
Even if the Agreement and the Circular Letter effectively forbade (at the
private law level) banks from knowingly assisting in the violation of U.S.
insider-trading laws, a large part of the problem would still remain. Swiss
banks are probably passive participants in many insider-trading transactions.
This unwitting participation can lead to serious problems if a U.S. court orders
the bank to disclose the identities of those customers (who may or may not be
U.S. nationals) who instructed it to buy or sell a particular security (which may
or may not be a U.S. security) on a U.S. exchange, even though such a
disclosure might be met with criminal prosecution by Swiss authorities [56]. In
this situation it is difficult for the bank to determine (1) whether the U.S.
court will apply sanctions for non-disclosure [57], (2) whether sanctions or the
threat of sanctions would constitute a defense to a Swiss criminal proceeding if
one were brought [58], and (3) whether the bank may safely insist that the SEC
proceed through diplomatic channels [59]. The potential for misunderstanding
is exacerbated by the SEC's inevitable uncertainty as to whether the bank was
actually an unwitting participant and the Swiss bank's uncertainty as to
whether the SEC is engaging in a fishing expedition.
There are means by which the Swiss banks can sidestep the conflict. In
advance of every transaction executed on behalf of a U.S. client (or all clients)
they may require waivers of confidentiality in the event of an SEC investiga-
tion. They may also choose to execute transactions solely on exchanges outside
the U.S. [60].
Unilateral action by the United States can increase or decrease the dimen-
sions of the Swiss banks' dilemma [61]. Enforcement alternatives should be
evaluated in light of their effectiveness in compelling disclosure and also their
probable effect on Swiss banking activity in the United States. It is important
to consider, as well, the effect of SEC and court actions on the sensitive
diplomatic channels that aid enforcement efforts in the most complicated
securities fraud cases [62]. In addition, the effect of unilateral action on the
possibility of reaching a more comprehensive transnational solution should be
carefully assessed [63].
3. Towards a resolution of the conflict
Although Switzerland has suggested that problems arising in the United
States with regard to bank secrecy are U.S. problems which must be resolved
domestically [64], the Swiss bank Agreement, the Circular Letter, and interna-
tional cooperation by treaty are evidence of Swiss concern with abuses of
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secrecy. Whether that concern will ever lead to the cooperative international
solution hoped for by many observers is less certain.
3.1. International cooperation
There is some justification for the view that formal international agreement
is only a partial solution, that it results in ineffective, cumbersome procedures
[651, and that its possibilities for effecting change seem to have been exhausted
[66]. One major effort to reach an international solution - begun with
negotiations in 1973 and concluded with the signing of the 1977 Treaty for
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters [67] - demonstrates the difficulty of
resolving the conflict by compromise. The Treaty gives Swiss judges the power
to compel a banker to give evidence upon formal request by the United States;
however, the Treaty contains several limitations that render it useless to
combat many forms of securities law violation. The principal limitation is the
Treaty's requirement that the information requested be in connection with
activities punishable as crimes in Switzerland [68]. Furthermore, the privacy of
persons not connected with the offense must be protected [69], and informa-
tion obtained may not be used to investigate any offense other than the
specific one for which the assistance is granted [70]. Even when these limita-
tions do not apply, Swiss assistance is subject to a variety of conditions that
may impede an investigation pursuant to the Treaty [71].
It is possible, however, to view the Treaty as a valuable pioneering effort,
laying a foundation of cooperative experience [72] upon which a more effective
compromise solution can be built. Recent talks between United States and
Swiss government officials demonstrate Swiss willingness to seek a solution to
the specific problem of insider trading [73]. A joint statement issued after the
first round of talks pointed to the possibility of either bank self-regulation by
extension of the 1977 private Agreement or expanded applicability of the
Mutual Assistance Treaty [74].
If the former alternative is chosen, Swiss banks will agree among themselves
to require from customers trading on U.S. markets advance waivers of con-
fidentiality in the event of an SEC investigation. Although there is no reason to
doubt that such an agreement would be an effective solution [75], whether it
will come into being may ultimately depend on Swiss bank customers.
Customers are likely to object to the waiver requirement, for waivers are
perceived by many as an undue erosion of confidentiality. Some may fear that
information divulged to the SEC could be used in matters beyond the scope of
the investigation for which it was requested. Therefore, if a private agreement
of this type is to become a reality, it will probably have to evolve in stages -
each stage requiring waivers from a broader category of customers. Such a
solution is uncertain and, in any event, for years it would probably be limited
to a narrow category of customers (e.g. directors and officers trading in stock
of their own company).
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Expansion of the Mutual Assistance Treaty would also be difficult to
accomplish. The Swiss have traditionally been circumspect in granting legal aid
to foreign states. The most recent enactment of their internal law on legal
assistance does not bind them internationally to provide such assistance [76].
Past experience indicates that the search for a mutually acceptable compromise
will probably require lengthy negotiation.
A third possible means of resolving the international legal conflict is
suggested in statements issued by the Swiss Banking Commission and the
Swiss Bankers' Association. These statements recommended that the Swiss
Parliament include a ban on insider trading in Swiss criminal law [77]. If such
a law is enacted, it will remove the main barrier to the SEC's use of the Mutual
Assistance Treaty [78]. Although this is not the first time Swiss bankers have
spoken of introducing criminal sanctions for insider trading [79], the Swiss
Parliament has not demonstrated any great interest in enacting such a law [80].
Even if insider trading is outlawed in Switzerland, the resulting availability of
the Mutual Assistance Treaty may not prove satisfactory to U.S. interests.
Information requested under the Treaty might take as long as three to five
years to obtain [81].
The various international solutions discussed here are significant future
possibilities which should not be jeopardized by U.S. judicial, administrative,
and legislative enforcement policy. At the present time, however, international
cooperation is probably not a practical solution to the SEC's enforcement
problem.
3.2. Unilateral enforcement
In the absence of an international solution, the SEC and the U.S. courts
have increasingly tended to take matters into their own hands. The foremost
example of a strong unilateral enforcement effort by the U.S. is a recently
decided case involving St. Joe Mineral's options traded on the order of Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana [82].
3.2.1. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana (the BSI case) [83]
In March 1981 the SEC brought suit against Banca Della Svizzera Italiana
(BSI) and "certain purchasers of call options -for the common stock of St. Joe
Minerals Corporation". The complaint alleged that the "certain purchasers"
had made a $1.4 million profit between March 10 and 12, during which time
Seagram Company announced a tender offer for St. Joe stock. The SEC
concluded that there was a strong probability that the purchasers had acted on
information "obtained or misappropriated" from confidential sources. The
trades in question had been executed on the order of BSI [841.
The SEC obtained a Temporary Restraining Order, freezing the proceeds of
the allegedly unlawful transactions in BSI's New York bank account and
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
J.E. Siegel / U.S. insider trading prohibition
directing that BSI disclose the identity of its principals "insofar as permitted
by law". Relying on that qualification, BSI insisted in court conferences and
communications with the SEC over an eight-month period that it could not
comply with the order because to do so would violate Swiss law [85].
At the end of October, the SEC moved the court to issue an order
compelling BSI to answer and imposing contempt sanctions for non-compli-
ance. The requested sanctions included a fine of $50,000 for each day of
non-compliance, a ban on trading in the U.S. securities markets, a total freeze
on BSI's assets in the United States, divestiture of all properties owned by BSI
within the United States, and an order for the arrest of any BSI officer,
director, or controlling person found in the United States [86]. In a hearing on
the motion, U.S. District Judge Milton Pollack issued an informal opinion
stating that he would sign the order containing contempt sanctions, following a
week's grace period in which BSI would have the opportunity to obtain waivers
of confidentiality from its clients. Judge Pollack indicated that his sanctions
would include fines and a ban on trading in U.S. markets [87].
In a formal written opinion issued ten days later, Judge Pollack described
his sanction threat as having had a "catalytic effect" on BSI [88]. Indeed,
during the week following the hearing, BSI urged its customers to authorize
disclosure so as to relieve BSI from possible criminal penalties [89]. On
November 12, BSI disclosed the names of three Panamanian corporations and
one Swiss corporation for whom the St. Joe options had been purchased. BSI
also revealed the name of the customer who had ordered the transaction on the
corporations' behalf: Giuseppe Tome, a close friend and adviser of Edgar
Bronfman, head of the Seagram Company [90]. Although the SEC had already
made efforts to investigate Tome [913, the BSI disclosure was a breakthrough.
An affidavit from BSI's assistant manager stated that Tome had instructed him
to purchase the options quickly and later-asked him to transfer options among
several Panamanian companies for "greater confidentiality within his organiza-
tion" [92]. On December 14, the SEC amended its original complaint, adding
specific allegations of insider-trading activity by Giuseppe Tome [93].
BSI's disclosures were not enough to avert the precedent-setting written
opinion issued by Judge Pollack on November 16 [94]. In his thorough and
powerful opinion, Judge Pollack invoked a long history of foreign-law conflict
cases to support his position that a Swiss bank that derives some profit from
trading on U.S. securities markets cannot "resist accountability for itself and
its principals.., by claiming their anonymity under foreign law" [95]. The BSI
opinion, however, goes further than the cases cited therein [96] and it remains
to be seen whether this fact will have a "catalytic effect" on the Swiss
investment community.
In the BSI opinion, Judge Pollack considered a number of factors that
courts have found important when faced with similar conflicts. Most are
enumerated in section 40 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law [97],
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which is probably the single most influential legal principle in U.S. cases
involving conflicts with foreign law [98]. Another principal factor relied upon
by Judge Pollack was the "good faith of the party resisting discovery", which
has also been a cornerstone of U.S. case law concerning foreign-law conflicts
since the Supreme Court's 1958 decision in Socit Internationale pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commnerciales, S.A. v. Rogers [99].
The facts in Soci~t Internationale do not closely resemble those in the BSI
case. In Soci&t Internationale, a Swiss holding company challenged the dismis-
sal of its complaint as a sanction for refusing to produce bank records in
compliance with a discovery order. The documents in question had been
constructively seized by the Swiss government. The Supreme Court held that
the sanction of dismissal was not justified in the absence of a showing of bad
faith. Judge Pollack observed that "[t]he Court indicated that a party who had
made deliberate use of foreign law to evade American law might be subject to
sanctions" [100]. Had the Swiss plaintiff "deliberately courted legal imped-
iments", this would have constituted bad faith, but the Court did not indicate
what facts might support such a contention [101].
Two other decisions cited in the BSI case do provide examples of bad faith
sufficient to support the imposition of sanctions. In 1n re First National City
Bank [102], a U.S. bank refused to produce certain documents, alleging that
their production would violate German law. The district court's finding of bad
faith was buttressed by its additional finding that German law did not, in fact,
prohibit disclosure [103]. Similarly, in Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co. [104], the
record contained overwhelming support for a finding of bad faith. The
defendant accounting firm claimed that Swiss secrecy law forbade it from
producing documents, but the court of appeals cited evidence that Andersen
had engaged in dilatory tactics, had failed to show that Swiss law forbade
production, and had deliberately tried to deceive the court [105]. The finding
of bad faith in the BSI case was based on a different assertion.
Judge Pollack's finding of bad faith reads as follows:
BSI acted in bad fiath. It made deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law to evade in a commercial
transaction for profit to it, the strictures of American securities law against insider trading.
Whether acting solely as an agent or also as a principal (something which can only be clarified
through disclosure of the requested information), BSI invaded American securities markets and
profited in some measure thereby [1061.
There is a strong message to Swiss banks in the implicit assumption that any
Swiss bank is guilty of bad faith if it does not disclose at the SEC's request,
when it has executed trades on U.S. markets which thereafter appear to the
SEC to be probable violations of U.S. law. Judge Pollack also made reference
to the agency law principle that holds an agent liable for the acts of an
undisclosed principal [1071. Taken to its logical extreme, this reasoning would
create liability on the part of an entity subject to foreign secrecy laws when it
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participates in any violation of U.S. law, however unwittingly.
A somewhat narrower criticism of the Swiss practice of bank secrecy may be
read from Judge Pollack's emphasis on the profitability of BSI's activity. In his
oral opinion issued from the bench, Judge Pollack suggested that the financial
interests of Swiss banks include profits attributable to secrecy [108]. The
implication is that a portion of the banks' earnings are received because they
offer a means of violating U.S. law. Because the banks, in this sense, hold
themselves out as conduits for illegal activity, they are guilty of bad faith.
As indicated above, there were several factors supporting Judge Pollack's
decision to sign the order threatening sanctions. Judge Pollack cited evidence
of Congressional concern regarding the practice of using foreign banks to
evade the U.S. securities laws. He also concluded that using diplomatic
channels or letters rogatory, as suggested by BSI, were "not viable substitutes
for direct discovery", and he seemed to consider these suggestions to be
dilatory tactics [109]. Only one of the factors cited clearly distinguished this
case from any other in which a Swiss bank might unwittingly be used to
participate in an illegal transaction. A State Department legal adviser had
submitted an affidavit informing the court that after discussions with U.S. and
Swiss officials the Department of State had concluded that it did not object to
the SEC's attempts to gain information through civil discovery [110]. In
addition, the court stated that the Swiss government had expressed no objec-
tion to the SEC investigation [111]. Although this reference to abstention by
the Swiss and U.S. governments would make possible a narrower reading of
the BSI case, the court did not expressly so limit its opinion. Swiss banks may
wonder whether, in the absence of State Department action, BSI would
nonetheless have found itself caught between the conflicting demands of two
sovereigns by virtue of its choice to engage in trading activity on U.S. markets.
There is reason to question how effective Judge Pollack's sanction-threat
approach would be in a case that offered greater practical problems. In the BSI
case, the threat of sanctions was particularly powerful because BSI had a New
York subsidiary, large New York bank accounts, and extensive U.S. invest-
ment holdings [112]. In a case where these factors are absent, the threat of
sanctions would be significantly less persuasive. Bringing out "the big guns"
can achieve results only when there is something of value to fire upon [113].
There is also the possibility that a sanction-threat aproach may prove
counterproductive. Some Swiss banks may choose to diminish the dimensions
of the dilemma they face by reducing to a minimum their U.S. assets. More
important, Swiss banks may choose to retreat beyond the jurisdictional reach
of the courts [114]. Despite the historically broad judicial conception of the
extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities laws [115], a U.S. court would have
difficulty establishing personal jurisdiction over a Swiss bank not deemed to be
doing business in the United States. This would be the case if a bank were
doing no more in the United States than arranging for U.S. broker-dealers to
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purchase securities on U.S. markets upon the order of foreign customers [116].
Jurisdiction would be even more difficult to establish were Swiss banks simply
to purchase U.S. securities on Zurich or London exchanges [117]. In both cases
insider-trading violations could still be perpetrated through Swiss banks and
would effect similar harm, but these violations would be nearly impossible to
investigate.
The danger of Swiss disinvestment is somewhat mitigated by the fact that
this action is not a commercially attractive option for the Swiss. The Swiss
cannot be expected to give up happily the breadth and depth of U.S. markets.
It is also unlikely that all Swiss trading activity on U.S. markets - in options,
for example - can be accommodated by foreign exchanges.
3.2.2. Alternatives to the BS1 approach
Judge Pollack, commenting on his decision to sign the order threatening
sanctions, stated that he had "no other reasonable alternative" [118]. One may
speculate that, having been presented with a similar secrecy defense ten years
before [119], Judge Pollack was unwilling to view the wait for an internation-
ally negotiated solution as a reasonable alternative. In lieu of the sanctions-
threat approach and short of waiting for an international Godot, two alterna-
tives were open to Judge Pollack. Either he could have deferred to the SEC's
rule-making authority or he could have written a more narrowly focused
opinion.
The first of these alternatives could have been accomplished by means of an
opinion denying the request for sanctions in light of the SEC's failure to adopt
a proposed amendment to Securities Exchange Act Rule 17a-3(a) (9) [120].
This amendment, first proposed in 1976, would have required U.S. broker-
dealers to obtain from any person authorized to transact business for an
unnamed account assurances that such person would furnish the name of the
beneficial owner of the account at the SEC's request. The proposal was met
with considerable consternation on the part of U.S. broker-dealers - not only
because they feared disinvestment, but also because the Rule would have
placed much of the enforcement burden on their shoulders. A broker-dealer
attempting to comply with the rule might lose business to those brokers who
did not comply, and non-compliance would not be immediately apparent. In a
release concerning the proposal the SEC stated that it would consider publish-
ing a list of intermediaries who did not live up to their agreements and that
broker-dealers who continued to maintain accounts for such intermediaries
would be in violation of the Rule [121]. In addition, it was recognized that even
if broker-dealers were able to get these assurances from foreign banks, in some
cases there would be no practical means of enforcement.
The amended Rule was designed to provide preventive enforcement, com-
parable to that contemplated by an extension of the 1977 private Agreement
among Swiss banks [122]. Lacking the feature of self-policing by the Swiss
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banks, however, the proposed rule could easily be circumvented. A Swiss
banker wishing to purchase shares of stock traded on a U.S. exchange could
purchase these shares from a non-U.S. broker-dealer who had purchased the
same shares for his own account through a U.S. broker-dealer. The proposed
Rule would not apply to either the purchase from the U.S. broker-dealer or the
Swiss bank's transaction with the non-U.S. broker-de4ler. Nonetheless, the
Swiss bank in this scenario might be acting for the account of a customer in
possession of inside information.
Rule 17a-3(a) (9) has neither been adopted nor withdrawn from considera-
tion [123]. It has been criticized by some as "unnecessary", because the act of
trading on U.S. markets may be, by itself, sufficient to require compliance with
U.S. law [124]. Judge Pollack's opinion evidences a like view, and in light of
the doubtful effectiveness of preventive enforcement by the SEC, this appears
to be the wiser approach.
Such an approach, however, necessarily denies the force of Swiss law and,
therefore, cannot be said to resolve the actual conflict. This inherent limitation
of unilateral action suggests that, in the absence of a bilateral solution, U.S.
law should be applied with moderation. Moderation implies that full account
should be taken of Swiss interests and that each case should turn on its own
factual setting. In Judge Pollack's application of an almost per se bad faith
test, there was no moderate application of U.S. law. The BSI opinion could be
read to require any Swiss bank under conflicting legal requirements to choose
obedience to U.S. law.
Assuming that the order to apply sanctions was proper in the BSI case, a
more moderate justification of that result was available. Had Judge Pollack
identified the communications of Swiss officials and the State Department as
factors essential to his opinion, he would not have needed to rely on a
questionable finding of bad faith [125]. Such limiting language need not have
required Swiss acquiescence in disclosure of bank secrets, but it would have
prescribed some indication that the problem had been considered on a di-
plomatic level. It may be objected that, as a matter of precedent, this
hypothetical holding would require bilateral government intervention in every
future SEC investigation involving a secrecy/disclosure conflict. Nonetheless,
in contrast to the actual decision in the BSI case, this approach recognizes that
the conflict implicates both private and governmental interests. This recogni-
tion lessens the likelihood that either the Swiss banks or the Swiss government
will perceive the conflict as one to be resolved principally by the other.
Although time-consuming, a requirement of government consultation would
contribute to a spirit of cooperative enforcement. Cooperative experience and
mutual familiarity with the concerns underlying both secrecy and disclosure
rules would facilitate future efforts to reach an acceptable resolution of the
conflict.
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Also in keeping with an approach of moderation, Judge Pollack could have
provided some guidance as to what future courts might consider as indicia of
good faith. Indeed, if his finding of bad, faith was premised largely on the
assumption that Swiss banks profit by holding themselves out as vehicles for
evading U.S. law [126], Judge Pollack might have outlined actions, short of
automatic disclosure, that would demonstrate good faith and the desire to
avoid illegal acts. There are several ways in which Swiss banks, either individu-
ally or in concert, may impose a waiver of confidentiality requirement on their
customers so as to minimize the possibility that the banks will be unwitting
participants in insider-trading transactions [ 127]. Short of requiring waivers for
all transactions executed on U.S. exchanges, the banks may require waivers
from all U.S. citizens or from all customers who fall within a group of specified
insiders in relation to the stock in which they wish to trade. Alternatively,
Swiss banks may require waivers that would become effective upon the
announcement of a tender offer for the stock within twenty days after the trade
was executed. By adopting waiver policies, individual banks could test customer
reaction and lay the foundation for an eventual comprehensive and binding
agreement on waiver requirements among all Swiss banks. In addition, if these
limited waiver policies were considered defenses to an SEC allegation of bad
faith, Swiss banks would have a means of legally protecting themselves without
having to choose between serious compromise of secrecy and withdrawal from
U.S. markets. At the same time, abuses of secrecy to the detriment of U.S.
interests would be reduced.
4. Conclusion
The enforcement of insider-trading prohibitions is a huge task, and obtain-
ing the names of alleged violators who operate from secrecy jurisdictions is but
one component of that task, albeit a difficult one. If SEC investigations do not
proceed beyond the Swiss (or any other) wall of secrecy, the resulting gap in
the U.S. regulatory framework will allow insider trading to flourish. On the
other hand, efforts to penetrate Swiss bank secrecy risk alienating the Swiss
investment community to the detriment of the U.S. economy and of efforts to
find a cooperative solution.
Judge Pollack's decision in SEC v. Banca Della Soizzera Italiana is a major
step in the direction of taking that risk. That decision, however, has also
highlighted the need for a more satisfactory resolution of the legal conflict.
Indeed, it may have provided the impetus necessary to achieve such a solution.
Through recent negotiations and discussions, Swiss and U.S. officials have
outlined several paths along which cooperation may develop. True resolution
of the conflict, whether by treaty, by Swiss banks' self-regulation, or by Swiss
legislation, lies in this direction.
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The serious nature of the policy conflicts involved, however, suggests that a
resolution will require many years of evolution before effective enforcement of
U.S. law can be realized. To ensure that unilateral enforcement efforts facili-
tate rather than jeopardize cooperative efforts, U.S. law should be applied with
moderation. Trading on U.S. markets by Swiss banks should not be seen as
requiring automatic abdication of the banks' domestic legal obligation of
secrecy. Rather, each case should be evaluated on its facts, with particular
emphasis on indications of governmental concern and the defendant Swiss
bank's efforts to prevent its use as a conduit for illegal activity. Although this
approach will necessarily add to the SEC's investigatory burden, it may lead to
more comprehensive and effective future enforcement of U.S. insider-trading
laws, while detracting little from present enforcement.
To be sure, Switzerland is not the only country where banking secrecy is
practiced. Eventually, it is to be hoped that multilateral negotiations will
evolve from the current bilateral talks. A satisfactory agreement on secrecy and
securities regulation between the United States and Switzerland may provide a
model for cooperation on the part of a much wider group of nations that
enforce banking secrecy.
Editors' postscript
As this article goes to press, a new chapter is being added to Ms. Siegel's
story. On August 31, 1982, the United States and Switzerland signed an accord
allowing Swiss banks to cooperate with the SEC in investigations of insider
trading. This agreement will continue in effect until the Swiss parliament
enacts measures outlawing insider trading.
A complex procedure for information sharing is established under the new
"memorandum of understanding". An SEC request for information will be
relayed by the Justice Department to the Swiss Federal Office for Police
Matters, which will submit the request to a three-member commission organized
by the Swiss Bankers Association. If the transaction being investigated is
related either to a business merger or to the acquisition of at least 10% of a
company's shares, and if it meets other requirements established under the
agreement, then the Swiss bank involved will be asked to provide a detailed
report of the transaction and to freeze the account of the suspect client.
According to the negotiators, this new agreement does not have the binding
force of an international treaty. It is, however, a giant step toward the
comprehensive international cooperation that Ms. Siegel envisions for the
future [128].
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Thomas, 622 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) B-I, -4 (Sept. 30, 1981).
[5] In the past four years, the SEC has pressed charges in about as many cases of insider trading
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Joe transactions, the Swiss bank might avert a precedent-setting judicial opinion in writing",
Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1981 at 24, col. 4, Judge Pollack was not persuaded that the war was
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Since the Court is unable to predict... whether other notions of confidentiality may be
developed on behalf of the disclosed Panamanian customers of the bank, applicable to
Switzerland or elsewhere, it becomes useful to analyze the legal situation posited. The
principles to be applied will be similar and will serve the further purposes of this case.
92 F.R.D. at 114.
[95] Id. at 119.
[96] See infra text accompanying notes 102-107.
[97] Restatement (second) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (1965). Section 40 reads as
follows:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction.
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
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by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states.
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
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state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
[98] See generally U. Kbstlin, supra note 7, at 89-94.
[99] 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
[100] 92 F.R.D. at 114.
[101] 357 U.S. at 208-209.
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Id. at 1373.
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Plaintiff's memo contains the bald assertion that "it may be assumed, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, that [the customer or customers whose identities BSI is prohibited by
Swiss law from revealing] are ficticious and [that] the Defendant merely seeks to conceal its
own impermissable and illegal activities". This irresponsible, unsubstantiated assertion is not
only not backed by a shred of evidence but also suggests that in its vigilance the SEC staff
has lost touch with the underpinnings of the American judicial system. Indeed, viewed in
conjunction with the staff's apparent inclination to assume that a party is "guilty until
proven innocent", its desire to impose draconian sanctions upon a Swiss national for
refusing to violate Swiss law seems relatively tame.
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Application for an Order at 5! n.5.
[108] Record at 37-38.
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by a foreign state) to a competent Swiss authority." Aubert, supra note 8.
[110] 92 F.R.D. at 118.
11111 Maurice Aubert. expert witness for the defense in the BSI case, denies that the Swiss
authorities made no objection. Le secret, supra note 58, at 443-444.
1112] Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Applications for an Order at 11-12.
[113] In one instance of a securities fraud investigation where the SEC wished to repatriate funds
as part of an enforcement action, the SEC applied for and obtained a court order requiring
(he Swiss Credit Bank to transfer assets from its office in Zurich to its branch office in New
York. Despite serious questions regarding the court's jurisdiction and the bank's claim that it
was caught between conflicting orders by the Swiss and U.S. courts, the district judge
threatened to seize the New York branch. The threat, though not part of an official court
order, was apparently enough to induce the bank to reach a compromise agreement in which
it deposited a letter of credit in New York. Had there been no branch to seize, the court,
unless willing to disregard accepted principles of international law, would have been faced
with a much tougher legal problem. For a fuller discussion of the SEC's prosecution of
American Institute Counselors, see Meyer, supra note 8, at 75-78.
[114] In anticipation of Judge Pollack's decision, Sam Scott Miller, general counsel of Paine
Webber Inc., commented: "If the SEC position is upheld it could send a fair shock through
the money centers of the world. Internationally, the American markets are viewed as
attractive, but there's an awful lot of money that gets funneled through the Swiss thai values
privacy." Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1981, at 55, col. 3.
[115] See, e.g., ITT v. Vencap, 519 F. 2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); see generally Note, American
Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (1976).
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100 but this could be expanded, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1981 at 55, col. 3.
[118] N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 37, col. 6.
[119] Trade Development Bank v. Continental Insurance Co., No. 71 Civ. 85 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,
1971) (Pollack, J.).
[120] For the Commission's perspective on the proposed change in the Rule, 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-
3(a) (9), see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13149, reprinted in [1977 Transfer, Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,871. The text of the proposed Rule reads:
A record in respect to each cash and margin account with such member, broker or dealer
containing the name and address of each beneficial owner of such account and in the case of
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a margin account, the signature of such owner; provided that, in the case of a joint account
or an account other than an account of a natural person, such records are required only in
respect of the person or persons authorized to transact business for such account if such
persons undertake to furnish, at the request of the Commission, the name and address of
each beneficial owner of such account.
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[123] 44 Fed. Reg. 28,678 (1979). A similar regulation proposed by the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) three years ago with regard to trades executed on commodities
exchanges was withdrawn. 45 Fed. Reg. 30,427 n.7 (1980), reprinted in 553 Sec. Reg. & L.
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